

Knowledge and Reality
Colour
(the primary/secondary qualities distinction)

Primary Readings

- (!) **Boghossian, P. and Velleman, D., ‘Color as a secondary quality’,** *Mind* 98 (1989). (Reprinted in Byrne and Hilbert).
- (!) **McGinn, C., *The Subjective View*,** Clarendon Press (1983), **pp. 5-15.**
- (!) **Campbell, J., ‘A simple view of colour’,** in Haldane and Wright (eds.), *Reality, Representation and Projection*, OUP (1993). Also reprinted in Byrne and Hilbert (eds.).
- **Boghossian, P. and Velleman, D., ‘Physicalist theories of color’,** *Phil. Review* 100 (1991), pp. 67-106. (Reprinted in Byrne and Hilbert).
- **Mackie, J. L., *Problems for Locke*,** OUP (1976), **ch. 1.**
- **McDowell, J., ‘Values and secondary qualities’,** (especially §3-4) in Honderich T. (ed.), *Morality and Objectivity*, Routledge (1985).

Useful Collections

- Byrne, A., and Hilbert D. R. (eds.), *Readings on Color*, MIT press (1997).

Background Readings:

- Maud, B., ‘**Color**’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*,

Questions:

- (1) Are colours in some sense mind independent?
- (2) Is anything *really* coloured?
- (3) Is there a defensible distinction between primary and secondary properties? If so, under which of the two do colour properties fall?
- (4) Should ‘colour’ be spelled with or without the ‘u’? Is there a fact of the matter?